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Abstract 
 
Laruelle's first book Phenomenon and Difference: An Essay on Ravaisson's Ontology (1971) is unan-
imously overlooked as having little relevance to his later non-philosophy. On the contrary, this paper 
analyses Laruelle's dissertation and Ravaisson's writings to show how Ravaisson enables Laruelle to 
develop non-philosophy's three central ideas of decision, radical immanence, and cloning. Firstly, 
Laruelle inherits Ravaisson's critique of Platonism and anti-Platonism as dividing the unity of being 
between two terms, of which one alone is conflated with being to the detriment of the other as non-
being. Moreover, Laruelle follows Ravaisson's third way of envisioning being as a radical imma-
nence, which philosophy presupposes to constitute its dualisms by dividing being into opposed terms. 
Finally, Laruelle's cloning adheres to Ravaisson's eclectic method of expressing being's true imma-
nence through his cohering of all philosophies, as well as disciplines like art and religion, into a single 
narrative of one and the same being's self-unfolding.  
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More than any other aspect of his oeuvre, Laruelle's untranslated dissertation and 
first published book, Phenomenon and Difference: An Essay on Ravaisson's Ontology 
(1971), is unanimously overlooked in Laruellian scholarship. This lack of attention is partly 
due to the fact that Laruelle's work on Ravaisson has yet to be translated into English. 
However, the fact that it has not been translated speaks to the implicit consensus that it is an 
idiosyncratic exception, which has little to do with Laruelle's subsequent development of a 
mature non-philosophy. Laruelle himself tacitly encourages this reading of his dissertation 
insofar as he never mentions Ravaisson again, and retroactively characterizes his non-
philosophy as emerging out of his subsequent critiques of the philosophies of difference. 
Finally, the dissertation is not only overlooked because of its perceived irrelevance to Laru-
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elle's mature non-philosophical thought, but also because of its subject matter of Ravaisson. 
Whereas translations of Laruelle's writings on Badiou, Derrida, Deleuze, Nietzsche and 
Heidegger have either been published or are forthcoming due to the immense interest in 
these other thinkers, there is relatively little interest in Ravaisson. Ravaisson's whole corpus 
has yet to even be published in French, and his selected writings have only recently been 
translated into English (Ravaisson 2016). Where Ravaisson is mentioned, it is almost al-
ways as a historical footnote to Bergson's theory of habit.1 So, what ultimately emerges out 
of the secondary scholarship on Laruelle is the absence of any detailed discussion of his 
first work on Ravaisson, which is due to its perceived irrelevance for comprehending his 
non-philosophical science of philosophy that interests most commentators.  
Contrary to this dominant (non-)reading of his first work, this paper shall analyse 
both Laruelle's dissertation and Ravaisson's own writings to show how Ravaisson first 
enables Laruelle to develop non-philosophy's three central ideas of philosophy as decision, 
the Real as radical immanence, and cloning as the staging of a vision-in-One. Firstly, Laru-
elle inherits Ravaisson's critique of both Platonism and various anti-Platonisms as dividing 
the unity of being between two terms, of which one alone is conflated with all of being to 
the detriment of the other as mere appearance or non-being. Moreover, Laruelle follows 
Ravaisson's third way of envisioning being or the Real as an originary radical immanence, 
which all philosophies presuppose to constitute their various dualisms by dividing being 
into two opposed terms. Finally, Laruelle's ideas of cloning and modelisation adheres to 
Ravaisson's eclectic method of expressing being's true immanence through his cohering of 
the diversity of philosophies, as well as other disciplines like art and religion, into a single 
historical narrative of one and the same being's self-unfolding. By tracing how Laruelle 
discovers the notions of decision, radical immanence and cloning in Ravaisson's ontology, 
we will see how non-philosophy is still providing an answer to philosophy's own funda-
mental question of being conceived as the Real, even as it rejects all historical philosophies' 
ideas of being understood as decisions. 
 
1. Non-Philosophy in a Nutshell: Decision, Immanence, Cloning 
 
Over the course of the works composing what he terms the Philosophy II and III pe-
riods of his corpus, Laruelle argues that all philosophy is constituted by a "decision" that 
divides the unity of the Real by arbitrarily privileging a mere part of it as exhausting all of 
                                                          
1 The almost exclusive reception of Ravaisson's thought through Bergson has led to a focus on the 
former's concept of habit. See Bergson 2017. As we shall see, Laruelle goes against this grain by 
focusing on Ravaisson's more metaphysical writings. 
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the Real to the detriment of the opposite term as mere non-being or illusion. In what we 
will see is an appropriation of Ravaisson's critique of Platonism, Laruelle gives as an ex-
ample of philosophical decision Plato's "Greek" gesture of identifying being with an ideal 
unity to the detriment of the sensible world of becoming as mere appearance: 
Philosophy is a manner of thinking that reduces all phenomena to the combination of 
two parameters relative to each other: Unity and Scission, or Identity and Difference. 
The Greeks, our contemporaries, could never surpass this mixture, and it is this invar-
iant that forms our tradition through its innumerable variations (Laruelle 1991, 249).2 
Although this decision is arbitrary in the sense that it is not based on what the Real is actu-
ally like in its totality, but merely on what the philosopher decides reality to be, it gains its 
aura of validity from the philosopher's own sense of its self-sufficiency, what Laruelle calls 
"the principle of sufficient philosophy" (Laruelle 1989, 17). 
Of course, Laruelle is not the first to critique Plato; the philosophers of difference 
like Nietzsche and Deleuze also attempted to overcome Platonism. If Laruelle's critique of 
Platonism still holds for these anti-Platonists, however, it is because their attempt to surpass 
Plato simply makes the inverse mistake of deciding that the sensible world of becoming, 
multiplicity and difference is alone real to the detriment of the ideal, representation and 
unity as mere illusions of thought. So, although the anti-Platonists are able to bestow a 
reality to the sensible world where Plato saw only appearance, they still fall into the same 
trap of deciding that it alone is real. Laruelle continues: "difference does not give us the 
One but rather the Dyad, which is an ontological concept or peripheral to ontology [where 
ontology denotes philosophical decision]" (Laruelle 1991, 23). Whether philosophers de-
cide that the Real is an ideal unity or sensible difference, for Laruelle, both rest on an arbi-
trary decision that fails to account for the opposite term that they denigrate as non-being. 
Laruelle's own non-philosophy is designed to avoid making such decisions by ex-
posing how all philosophies presuppose a greater Real which is indifferent to the dualisms 
that philosophical decisions create. For Laruelle, all decisions presuppose a "radical imma-
nence" or "One-in-person" that philosophy cuts up into two falsely opposed terms, of which 
only one is granted an ontological stature. In reality, however, both terms are equally real in 
that they are immanent to the Real as a One anterior to all oppositions. It is crucial to delim-
it Laruelle's notion of the One, what he also calls "unary," from the Neo-Platonic concept of 
the One, or what Laruelle distinguishes as the "greco-unitary": "the One is especially not 
the Unity with which Greco-Western thought regularly confounded it. I insist: from the 
Greeks to the thinkers of difference, one has put the One at the service of the synthesis of 
                                                          
2 All citations to French texts are my own translations unless otherwise stated. 
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opposites. (…) This confusion is the foundation of unitary or authoritarian thought" (Laru-
elle 1989, 25). On the one hand, the Neo-Platonic One is predicated as an ideal unity which 
thereby excludes sensible becoming from its ontological midst. Conversely, the Laruellian 
One is simply the name for the immanence of both the falsely opposed ideal and sensible 
terms, which the Neo-Platonic One presupposes in order to separate itself as the ideal from 
the sensible in the first place.  
Since all philosophical decisions rest on attributing certain predicates to the Real to 
the exclusion of other terms not covered by those privileged predicates, it is not possible to 
positively think the Real in its radical immanence. To think the Real would be to describe it 
in terms of predicates. To attribute predicates to the Real, however, would be to exclude 
their opposite predicates, and thereby create an opposition between the Real and its contra-
ry predicates. To grasp the Real qua the One is to instead think it as encompassing all pred-
icates we can ever conceive, but without any one or number of them exhausting it. As 
Laruelle succinctly puts it, "the One is the immanent paradigm of the term and its specifici-
ty irreducible to all ideality or rapport" (Laruelle 1985, 52). Given that we can never direct-
ly describe the One, grasping it becomes a matter of indirectly alluding to it by showing 
how philosophy always presupposes an anterior immanence that it slices up to decide that 
which is and is not. Laruelle terms "cloning" this process of showing how philosophical 
decisions that constitute reality, or what Laruelle also calls the "world," presupposes the 
Real as a radical immanence: "because it is foreclosed to all knowledge, the vision-in-One 
can only clone its identity from the material of the mixed with which the capital-world 
furnishes it" (Laruelle 2000, 54). Termed differently, cloning stages a vision-in-One 
through the non-philosophical procedure of taking a philosophical decision as one's materi-
al, and revealing how it implies an original radical immanence to generate its world by 
separating it from the rest of the Real as an incompossible term. 
Already in the later works of Philosophy III and evermore so in Philosophies IV and 
V, Laruelle develops the similar notion of "modelisation." Like cloning, modelisation 
amounts to a staging of a vision-in-One, albeit beyond philosophy in other practices, such 
as art, religion and science: "we can use diverse models, philosophical, theological, scien-
tific, to interpret, and not to illustrate, this formalism" (Laruelle 2007, 23). While Laruelle 
had already been modelling other practices such as ethics and political theory before 2004, 
it is with that year's publication of La Lutte et l'utopie à la fin des temps philosophiques that 
he formalizes this procedure of modelling. There, Laruelle explains that not only philoso-
phy, but all practices rest on certain decisions that split the immanence of their respective 
objects of study into contraries: "we pose that each practice, ordinarily called ‘regional,' 
possesses a specific quasi-ontology, an original conception of the real and procedures for 
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appropriating it for itself" (Laruelle 2004, 101). Since all practices make philosophical 
decisions, non-philosophy is not limited to cloning philosophy, but every practice by identi-
fying their decision, subtracting it, and thereby making way for the vision-in-One. Here, 
Laruelle is quick to specify that non-philosophy does not decide the true essence of the 
objects of other practices, which remain autonomous. On the contrary, non-philosophy 
precisely bestows these practices their autonomy by extracting philosophy's infiltration of 
their methods and objects of inquiry: "non-philosophy only affects the sciences and arts as 
much as the philosophizable has infiltrated their meta-language, it has no effects on the 
practices themselves" (Laruelle 2004, 111-2). Laruelle envisions this subtraction of philo-
sophical decisions from regional practices as the vocation of an "international non-
philosophical organisation," or "ONPHI." The work of ONPHI consists in applying non-
philosophy's conceptual tools to local practices by re-modelling those practices on a radical 
immanence to locally materialize a vision-in-One: "an ONPHI must be a manner of model-
ling by way of the operatory practice of communicating the philosophizable and its ap-
pearance" (Laruelle 2004, 141). The bulk of Laruellian scholarship that applies non-
philosophical concepts to disciplinary fields like psychoanalysis, feminist theory, ecology, 
political theory and media studies can thus be seen as modelling the One's regional appari-
tion in the world of decisions and predicative thought (see, for instance, Moulinier 1999; 
Smith 2013; Kolozova 2014 and 2015; Galloway 2014; Gangle, Rocco and Greve 2017). 
Such are the essentials of Laruelle's non-philosophy: the critique of Platonism and 
anti-Platonisms for deciding the Real by dividing it into two opposed terms; the re-
envisioning of the Real as the One of radical immanence; and the materialization of a vi-
sion-in-One by cloning or modelling philosophical materials and regional practices as di-
verse as art, science and religion. 
 
2. Laruelle's Approach to Ravaisson: Phenomenon, Difference, Ontology 
 
The best entry-point into Laruelle's Phenomenon and Difference: An Essay on Rav-
aisson's Ontology is by looking at the three keywords of its title: phenomenon, difference, 
and ontology. The subtitle clearly indicates that Laruelle is specifically interested in Rav-
aisson's writings on the history of metaphysics rather than the much more frequent interest 
in his theory of habit. The fact that Laruelle uses the word ontology instead of metaphysics 
as Ravaisson does also betrays Laruelle's intention to constantly update older conceptual 
paradigms with new terms. In this case, the change from metaphysics to ontology can be 
read in light of Heidegger's critique of metaphysics as distinct from a fundamental ontology 
(which Laruelle repeatedly links to Ravaisson's ontology). By referring to Ravaisson's met-
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aphysics as ontology, then, Laruelle is positioning Ravaisson's thought as something to be 
advocated rather than abandoned as per the metaphysics of presence.  
Laruelle opens the book by explaining that, although he will discuss difference, he is 
not seeking to rehabilitate difference against identity: "difference is only this essay's theme, 
not its thesis or concept" (Laruelle 1971, 9). It is crucial to avoid lopping in Laruelle's work 
with Deleuze's Difference and Repetition, Derrida's Writing and Difference, and other cele-
brations of difference in late 1960s France. Against this grain, Laruelle proposes to critique 
difference by drawing on Ravaisson's critique of anti-Platonic philosophies. While Ravais-
son does not describe such anti-Platonic, pluralistic philosophies as "philosophies of differ-
ence" as Laruelle does, his target is nonetheless the same in that he takes aim at philoso-
phers who cut up the unity of being in favour of a multiplicity of irremediably particular, 
individuated things. Here as with the term ontology, Laruelle updates Ravaisson's critique 
of anti-Platonism so as to transform it into a critique of the philosophies of difference that 
were all the rage in late 1960s and early 1970s Paris. 
Finally, the first term of the title is phenomenon. This refers to the way that Laruelle 
uses Ravaisson to precisely save that which is precisely condemned as phenomenon or 
appearance from both Platonism and anti-Platonism's stripping it of all reality. On the one 
hand, Platonism cuts up being by deciding that only the ideal is real to the denigration of 
the sensible part of being as mere epiphenomena. On the other hand, philosophies of differ-
ence do link difference to what Plato called appearance, and thus seek to ontologize it. 
However, they then oppose this to unity, ideality and representation as a new phantasmic 
phenomenon. For Laruelle as for Ravaisson, any concept of being conceived as the Real 
has to include everything that there is, including even phenomena, be it the ideal or the 
sensible, if it is to seize the radical unity of all things without remainder.  
  
3. Ravaisson's History of Metaphysics: Materialism, Idealism, Being 
 
On Laruelle's reading, Ravaisson conceives of philosophy as first philosophy, ontol-
ogy or metaphysics, which he in turn understands to be the study of the unity of being co-
hering the multiplicity of seemingly different things. It is by looking at Ravaisson's two-
volume work on the historical reception of Aristotle's Metaphysics that we can best grasp 
his own concept of being.3 Ravaisson begins by arguing that the first pre-Socratic philoso-
phers affirmed that the sensible world is what is real (water, air, fire, etc.). More precisely, 
Ravaisson focuses on Heraclites' idea of being as a fire of becoming. According to Ravais-
                                                          
3 Apart from Laruelle's monograph, the best overview of Ravaisson's thought is Boutroux 1900. 
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son, the idea that being is a constant flux of becoming paved the way for the sophists' belief 
that there is a multiplicity of different and even contradictory truths without any overarch-
ing unity to cohere them all: 
Everything flows; such is the formula where Heraclites, perhaps without realizing it, 
creates the germ of scepticism. (…) If the principles are opposites that exist together 
and mixed one with the other, everything is at once white and black; (…) the contra-
dictory can be affirmed at once of the same thing; the true is confounded with the 
false. (…) Individual sensation is the only possible science: man is the measure of all 
things (Ravaisson 1963a, 274).4 
On Ravaisson's reading, both the pre-Socratics and the sophists split being into infinite 
differences upon differences. What Socrates then did was to introduce the idea of a concep-
tual unity underlying the multiplicity of sensible things: "abandoning the search for a gen-
eral explication of natural phenomena, Socrates attached himself to ethics, and he discov-
ered therein the true object of science, independent of sensation, the universal" (Ravaisson 
1963a, 276). Socrates' dialectical method thus involves moving from different and even 
contradictory ideas of what is good, virtuous, just or beautiful, to one unified Idea beyond 
all particular sensible instances: "the goal that he proposes for himself is to rediscover in 
particular existences an element of generality, and to bring the sensible diversity to the 
intelligible unity of the universal" (Ravaisson 1963a, 282). By seeking to cohere the sensi-
ble manifold around a unified Idea, Socrates tentatively grasped philosophy's true mission, 
a mission that Aristotle would later formalize, as the study of the unity of all things.  
For Ravaisson, Plato marked a regression from Socrates' thought of the unity of be-
ing when he affirmed that the ideal unity was alone real, and hence transcendent and sepa-
rate from particular, sensible things: "in itself, consequently, the idea, which gives particu-
lar things the unity of a general form, the idea is a thing apart, singular and individual" 
(Ravaisson 1963a, 292). The problem with Plato is that by conflating the ideal with all of 
reality, he thereby reduced the sensible world to a mere non-being, privation, or appear-
ance: "there is thus a non-being, to which all participates, or rather which is mixed and 
scattered in everything" (Ravaisson 1963a, 312). By identifying the very sensible phenom-
ena that we experience as non-being, Plato's concept of being as an ideal unity does not 
really capture all of being insofar as it excludes our very own experience. On the contrary, 
Plato divides the unity of being between two opposed terms of ideal unity and sensible 
multiplicity: "if the One, in a general manner, is the opposite of multiplicity, the first prin-
                                                          
4 I shall leave aside the question as to whether Ravaisson's readings of other philosophers are entirely 
accurate, since my present goal is to see how Ravaisson's understanding of the history of metaphysics 
informs Laruelle's non-philosophical thought. 
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ciple, God has his opposite, immortal, eternal like him" (Ravaisson 1963a, 342-3). Being 
thus loses the sense that it is supposed to be everything in favour of being only the ideal 
part of a greater Being, which is also sensible:  
All this occurs to the Platonists, because they (…) take opposites for principles, be-
cause they make of the One a principle, because they make numbers and ideas the 
first essences, and because they attribute to them an independent and separated exist-
ence. To these radical errors, from which derive all the absurd consequences that 
overwhelm Platonism, there is still a common root: it is the confusion of the logical 
order with the order of being (Ravaisson 1963a, 340-1). 
Clearly, Ravaisson's critique of Platonism anticipates Laruelle's idea that Plato identifies the 
real with the unitary ideal to the detriment of sensible differences in a way which divides 
the unary One between two opposed terms.  
For Ravaisson as for Laruelle, Platonism is wrong to conflate the ideal term with the 
totality of that which is. Instead, both the ideal unity and sensible diversity must be some-
how united in a single structure, law, principle, cause or being. Ravaisson ultimately finds 
such a synthesis of these two terms through his reading of Aristotle. Contrary to Plato, 
Aristotle grants a certain reality to individual sensible things. Affirming the irremediable 
difference of all things alone, however, would merely recapitulate the sophists' philosophy 
of difference. Instead, Aristotle argues that all individuated things are so many actualisa-
tions to different degrees of a pure act or absolute potentiality, which they presuppose in 
order to differentiate themselves by moving from potency to act. For Ravaisson, Aristotle's 
idea of the pure act or prime mover thus grants a reality to individuated things while also 
maintaining their absolute unity as so many acceptations of one and the same being: 
The universe thus forms a continuous system of ascending progressions, ordered by 
one and the same term. It is not an assemblage of independent and detached princi-
ples, (…) it is a chain of successive potencies subordinated one to the other, (…) ac-
cording to their common rapports with a same principle (Ravaisson 1963a, 59). 
With Aristotle, Ravaisson holds that metaphysics found its proper ground in the idea of the 
unity of all things, a unity that does not disavow the brute fact of sensible becoming, but 
rather subsumes it into a larger whole. 
In the second volume of his Essay on Aristotle's Metaphysics, however, Ravaisson 
argues that the stoics and epicureans mistook Aristotle for a pure empiricist without the 
idea of an overarching pure act. Consequently, they returned to an essentially pre-Socratic 
philosophy of sensible becoming and infinity diversity without any universalising principle: 
"from Aristotle's first successors to the first century of the Christian era, it is a common 
character to all the sects that dispute each other (…) to not suppose anything beyond na-
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ture" (Ravaisson 1963b 64-5). Ravaisson sees what Laruelle calls the "anti-Platonists" as 
equally problematic as Plato insofar as they simply assert the opposite of Plato by holding 
that only sensible diversity is real to the detriment of the ideal unity of thought. While Rav-
aisson holds that the exclusion of the sensible from being was where Plato fell afoul, to 
oppose the sensible as alone real as the stoics and epicureans did equally strips the ideal of 
any reality. The anti-Platonists thus maintain Platonism's essential dualism that cuts up the 
unity of being by merely inverting what counts as real (now the sensible) and what is mere-
ly phenomenal (the ideal). As Laruelle reformulates Ravaisson's critique of anti-Platonism, 
"to think difference in opposition to identity, in opposition to the concept, to think the simu-
lacrum in opposition to the model and to the Idea, this is to reintroduce in the act of think-
ing negativity that one endeavoured to dissociate from difference" (Laruelle 1971, 71). 
Although Ravaisson prefers to use proper names like stoicism and epicureanism, Laruelle 
generalises his critique of these philosophies as a critique of "anti-Platonisms" or "philoso-
phies of post-factum difference" (Laruelle 1971, 37-8, 39). Here, Laruelle updates Ravais-
son's critique of the stoics and epicureans to take aim at Deleuze, Derrida, Nietzsche and 
other more contemporary anti-Platonic philosophers of difference. We can thus see how 
Ravaisson's critique of Ancient Greek philosophies of difference first enables Laruelle to 
see the problem with the reigning anti-Platonism of his own time. It is not merely that Rav-
aisson's critique of anti-Platonism coincides with Laruelle's own critique of philosophies of 
difference; rather, Laruelle goes so far as to say it is only through Ravaisson that we can 
understand how philosophies of difference make the same, albeit inverted mistake as Plato-
nism of dividing the unity of being: "it is only from the ravaissonian perspective that a 
thought of difference as transcendental principle falls into the abstraction equal to that of 
the Platonism that it pretends to overcome" (Laruelle 1971, 99). Clearly, Laruelle is deeply 
indebted to Ravaisson's critique of anti-Platonism, and of Platonism, as so many produc-
tions of oppositions, which tear a real unity asunder. 
In his other works on the history of philosophy, Ravaisson traces how philosophy 
continues to be anchored in this battle between the Platonic ideal unity and anti-Platonic 
sensible becoming. In his Philosophy in France in the 19th Century, for instance, Ravaisson 
argues that 19th century French philosophy can be seen as a long civil war between Auguste 
Comte and the positivists' idea that there is nothing beyond the empirical world, and the 
spiritualists' notion of spirit as transcending the material body. While each favour the oppo-
site term, both positivists and spiritualists share a mutual mind-body dualism that splits the 
world between supposedly incompossible terms of subject and object, spirit and nature 
(Ravaisson 1885, 258). Much as Aristotle had developed an armistice for the ancient battle 
between the Platonists and anti-Platonists, however, so does Ravaisson see Schelling as a 
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19th century foil for the excesses of both positivism and spiritualism.5 On Ravaisson's ac-
count, Schelling provides another way to unify nature and spirit in one self-identical abso-
lute, which is indifferent to all dualisms. In short, Schelling's whole project centred on 
uniting the I and the non-I, nature and subject, which had been falsely opposed by both 
Fichte's privileging of the ideal over the object on the one hand, and Spinoza's reduction of 
spirit to nature on the other (Schelling 1994, 111-2). To this end, Schelling argues that the I 
can only be itself qua self-consciousness by externalizing itself as an other or object of its 
own thought. Nature or the non-I is thus the absolute spirit's alienation of itself to paradoxi-
cally affirm its self-identity by coming to think itself. In Schelling's terms, "the self cannot 
intuit the real activity as identical with itself, without at once finding the negative element 
therein, which makes it nonideal, as something alien to itself"; and: "it is with it in order to 
have an Other through which it would be able to contemplate itself" (Schelling 2001, 53; 
and 2000, xxxvi). The paradox of self-consciousness is that it has to negate itself by becom-
ing an other of itself to affirm itself as the thinking of itself. At times, Ravaisson character-
izes his own concept of being in these Schellingian terms of an absolute that thinks itself 
via its alienation in nature in a way that unites the subject and object from the false opposi-
tion that had been set up between them in 19th century French philosophy: "in all the differ-
ent degrees of the immense scale of things, there is everywhere one and the same thought, 
divided in some way from itself, dispersed in all directions into material multiplicity, but 
which, gradually retrieving itself, re-acknowledges itself" (Ravaisson 2016, 87). By com-
bining Aristotle and Schelling, Ravaisson is able to show both how unity presupposes sen-
sible diversity, and how sensible differences presuppose an ideal unity. On the one hand, 
unity needs difference insofar as it can only affirm its self-identity by becoming an object 
of itself as Schelling explains. On the other hand, difference only emerges as individuations 
of a unified, pure act as Aristotle has shown. As Laruelle reformulates it, "unity can only 
affirm itself by differences, movement, and differences can only suffer the Same in grace, 
which is thus the final ontological synthesis" (Laruelle 1971, 94-5). 
We can see from Ravaisson's history of metaphysics that the fundamental failure of 
philosophers to achieve a properly unified concept of being is due to the way they set up 
oppositions between two terms, of which only one is purportedly real. On the one hand, 
Platonism and its spiritualist variants affirm the ideal as alone real contra the sensible mul-
tiplicity of things. On the other hand, anti-Platonisms, from the stoics to the positivists, 
affirm that sensible diversity is alone real against the fantasies of thought and representa-
tion. In both cases, we are confronted with the problem of how being can be said to be the 
                                                          
5 For accounts of Schelling's influence on Ravaisson, see Courtine 1994; and Guibert 2007. 
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unity of all things given that there is a second term that exceeds its grasp. As Laruelle en-
capsulates Ravaisson's critique of philosophy, "Ravaisson searches Being in the falling 
short of metaphysical oppositions. All the oppositions are metaphysical, and in all opposi-
tion or scission, the excluded term continues to impregnate and govern the affirmed term" 
(Laruelle 1971, 37). Even if the excluded term is said to be merely appearance, phenome-
non, or non-being, it nonetheless forcefully impresses itself on the affirmed term as its 
presupposition in a way, which shows the philosophical concept of being to be purely arbi-
trary, partial, and unitary rather than unary. 
Drawing on Aristotle and Schelling, Ravaisson's positive project consists in recon-
ciling these philosophical oppositions between sensible difference and "alterity," and identi-
ty and "assimilation," by developing a concept of being that is able to encompass both 
without relegating one to the realm of non-being. As Laruelle explains, "[Ravaisson's nov-
elty] is, rather than creation, the experience of creation, the experience which is neither 
founded on radical alterity, nor on identification and assimilation – two symmetrical and 
twin hypotheses that Ravaisson will refuse –, the fusion in movement of subject and object" 
(Laruelle 1971, 33). Of course, Ravaisson's unified theory of being cannot be the One of the 
Platonists, which opposes itself to the difference of the outside. Instead, Ravaisson's being 
becomes an identity that is indifferent to oppositions insofar as it sees no oppositions be-
tween them, but only a unity, a reconciliation, or an immanence. Laruelle goes on: "the 
concept of identity must be modified. Identity interpreted as indifference of the opposed" 
(Laruelle 1971, 175). Notably, Laruelle first uses the term "radical immanence" that later 
denotes his own concept of the Real when describing Ravaisson's ontological concept of 
being as an absolute unity indifferent to all the opposites that it subsumes: "the problematic 
of ontologies of identity and radical immanence is only, more generally, the development of 
this post-Kantian principle: every opposition, whatever the content of its terms, must be 
founded on a synthetic substrate that is the presupposed identity of the two terms" (Laruelle 
1971, 191). Although Laruelle later abandons the notion that radical immanence is the 
project of philosophy, we can see that it first emerges as a possible conception of being that 
is adequate to meet the demands of ontology understood as the study of the single structure, 
law, principle, or cause that unifies all things. While still a philosopher, Ravaisson's goal, 
and even his solution of radical immanence, is thus the same as that of Laruelle's non-
philosophy: to develop a new, post-Platonic concept of the One that is able to incorporate 
that which Plato declared to be the difference of non-being in a radical unity without re-
mainder. 
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4. From Eclecticism to Modelisation:  
The Philosophy of Art and the Art of Philosophy 
 
Throughout his dissertation, Laruelle not only upholds the content but also the form of 
Ravaisson's writings as proffering a method for synthesizing opposed terms. Given that 
Ravaisson wants to unite the ideal and the sensible, syntax and being itself, it is crucial that 
his philosophical writing not be a thought of being that is distinct from being. Instead, his 
writing must somehow become one with being as its immanent self-expression. This is 
what Laruelle is getting at when he describes Ravaisson's method as "expressive" and "am-
biguous" in the sense that it shows how ostensibly opposed or "paradoxical" terms are actu-
ally equivocal, blurred, and even one and the same: "what Ravaisson will propose is to 
renounce the scission of the concept and the sensed. (…) He substitutes ambiguity and 
expression for paradox, and aesthetic grace to the transcendental exercise of thought. Dif-
ference as ambiguity is more apt than paradox to operate representation's effective ‘over-
coming'" (Laruelle 1971, 75). Laruelle contends that Ravaisson's ambiguous or expressive 
method betrays the influence of both late Neo-Platonism and Victor Cousin's eclecticism. 
On Ravaisson and Laruelle's readings, both spiritualists and late Neo-Platonists attempted 
to encapsulate different philosophies and fields of culture by showing how they are all 
partial expressions of one and same unified reality. According to Laruelle, Ravaisson's own 
method adheres to this eclectic method of tracing how the diversity of different cultural 
practices and disciplines presuppose a universal object of inquiry: "like Neo-Platonism and 
Alexandrianism, he attempts a reconciliation of thoughts, philosophies and religions in all 
the dimensions of history and in a unique principle: the reading is inseparable from an at-
tempt at unification" (Laruelle 1971, 45). Simply put, Ravaisson's eclectic method attempts 
to cohere the diversity of all particular objects of regional fields of inquiry as variations on 
a general theme. In this way, Ravaisson's hermeneutics should not be seen as thinking being 
from outside itself, but rather as being's immanent self-expression. 
To see what Laruelle is getting at in more detail, we can classify Ravaisson's writ-
ings into two categories: the long book-length histories of philosophy, and the shorter es-
says on art, religion and particular philosophies in isolation from their larger historical 
context. Apropos the first class of writings, Ravaisson's studies of the history of philosophy 
seek to show that there is one, universal truth of being, which different philosophies "actu-
alise" to varying degrees of success. Rather than see the history of philosophy as a plurality 
of discontinuous theoretical frameworks, Ravaisson unifies them as expressive to different 
levels of participation of one, monist reality. Although Ravaisson critiques Plato and fa-
vours Aristotle, this ought not therefore suggest that Platonic philosophy is completely false 
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or illusory. To oppose Platonism as outside the true thought of being as expressed in Aristo-
tle would only set up a dualism at the heart of philosophical thought. While Platonism is 
therefore included in the history of true philosophical thinking, it only captures the ideal 
fragment of being's radical immanence while overlooking its sensible dimension. As Laru-
elle puts it: 
The history of philosophy is not of a dialectical nature. (…) All philosophy already 
manifests on condition of its own difference the final sense of philosophy, which is to 
say the expression of Being. The distribution operated between two methods, one that 
goes into the sense of the decomposition of the all into its elements—all philosophies 
that arise from the first method already participate in the manifestation of Being and 
the two between them can only be separated by a difference of degree in the expres-
sion of Being (Laruelle 1971, 53-4). 
We can thus see how Ravaisson's very approach to developing his own metaphysics of 
radical immanence by tracing a history of other philosophies is crucial to revealing that 
radical immanence by cohering all philosophies around it as so many instantiations, whose 
differing degrees of emanation constitute their principle of individuation. Given that Laru-
elle appropriates Ravaisson's concept of being or the Real as a radical immanence, it is 
unsurprising that he also takes up Ravaisson's eclectic method when he proposes that the 
vision-in-One be staged by cloning philosophical decisions throughout the history of phi-
losophy to show how they all presuppose the One. 
The rest of Ravaisson's works are small, even fragmentary essays on "regional" sub-
jects such as art and religion. If Ravaisson cannot simply privilege one field as the foci of 
his entire inquiry, it is because his concept of being as a radical immanence demands that 
he do otherwise. To focus on one field would amount to upholding it as the privileged dis-
course of being, thereby opposing it to other possible syntaxes. Instead, Ravaisson's under-
standing of being requires that he be a renaissance man and cohere the multiplicity of disci-
plines and their various objects of inquiry into one radical immanence without outlier. In 
Laruelle's terms: "rather than attribute to them too precise functions in a system of logical 
possibilities, (…) he searches, like true Neo-Platonism did, to derive them from a unique 
principle of which they reveal themselves to be historically finalised expressions and mani-
festations: this principle, this will be Being" (Laruelle 1971, 47). By demonstrating how a 
diversity of fields ultimately presuppose the same concept of one, all-encompassing es-
sence, Laruelle contends that Ravaisson's eclectic method becomes one with his ontology 
of being as the pure act that all regions of reality more or less actualise: "the determination 
of the method thus drives to the heart of ontology, (…) for the method is only the being in 
movement or the process of Being manifesting itself" (Laruelle 1971, 30). Much as Ravais-
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son expresses this immanence in other extra-philosophical disciplines such as art and reli-
gion, so, too, does the later Laruelle materialise the vision-in-One by subtracting decisions 
in other local practices, such as religion and art as well, but also politics, ethics, science, 
and especially quantum physics.6 In what recalls his own characterization of Ravaisson's 
fragmentary, eclectic style of analysing many regional disciplines, the Laruelle of Philoso-
phy V even goes so far as to say that to properly understand a figure or subject, we should 
not delve too deep into the details for fear of losing the sense of the whole of which they are 
a part: "to seize a doctrine's fundamental or ideal enunciations, it is even recommended to 
sometimes cease to read a too admired author" (Laruelle 2011, 29). In Laruelle's under-
standing of how Ravaisson expresses his concept of being through the very eclectic form of 
his thought, we can thus see in embryonic form Laruelle's mature idea of cloning and mod-
elisation as the staging of a vision-in-One through philosophical, aesthetic, scientific, polit-
ical and religious materials. 
To give just one more concrete example, we shall look at Ravaisson's idea of the art 
of drawing.7 For Ravaisson, there are two approaches drawing can take when representing 
figures. On the one hand, drawing can model itself on geometry by cutting figures up into 
their smaller parts and particular differences. On the other hand, drawing can take Ravais-
son's preferred artistic approach and model itself on the naked eye's spontaneous intuition 
of how the parts of a figure cooperate together for the sake of the whole's greater harmony. 
So, whereas the geometrical approach divides figures into their parts, the artistic approach 
grasps the unity that the parts serve (Ravaisson 2016, 145).8 As Laruelle explains Ravais-
son's point here, "sight is not the object of a construction and is not discovered element by 
element, to which a mechanical juxtaposition would assure a factitious unity. Its coherence 
gives itself straightaway as such" (Laruelle 1971, 31). Ravaisson gives the specific example 
of how architects design buildings' particular rooms, doors and windows with an eye to 
serving the larger function of the whole: "a building, whatever it is exactly, should, like an 
animate being, be a whole whose parts cooperate, with the whole ensemble, in the pursuit 
of the same goal, and contribute to the expression of one and the same thought" (Ravaisson 
2016, 147). By linking parts to a greater whole, a multiplicity to a unity, architecture, draw-
ing and art more generally capture the harmony underlying all things beyond their individu-
                                                          
6 Laruelle stages the vision-in-One through many more disciplines than Ravaisson, such as science 
broadly speaking (1992; 2008); quantum physics (2010); ethics (2013; 2003; 2012); Marxist politics 
(2000); religion (2002; 2007; 2014); and photography (1996; 2014). 
7 For Ravaisson's writings on religion, see “Greek Funerary Monuments” and “Mysteries: Fragment 
of a Study of the History of Religions,” Ravaisson 2016. 
8 See also “On the Teaching of Drawing,” Ravaisson 2016. 
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ated particularities. Ravaisson affirms: "art (…) condenses what accidents have separated 
and what the spirit of nature gathers together" (Ravaisson 2016, 148). To the extent that art 
expresses the unity of being, it is not a separate mediation or discourse of being; rather, it 
immanently expresses being's self-manifestation. As Laruelle reformulates how art seizes 
the unity of radical immanence "in person": "aesthetics in Ravaisson's works is not mediat-
ing, art is not a derived expression of Being. (…) The flowing movement is even grace or 
the ‘in person'" (Laruelle 1971, 32). Here, Laruelle makes his first use of the term "in per-
son" to describe the way Ravaisson's eclectic method unveils a radical immanence behind 
all differences. While Laruelle will abandon much of the terminology he uses in his disser-
tation, he maintains this term (as well as radical immanence), both of which he initially uses 
to characterize Ravaisson's idea of being as a unity enveloping all things, a being that there-
fore closely resembles Laruelle's own idea of the Real as precisely a radical immanence, or 
the One-in-person.  
 
5. Laruelle, A Philosopher? 
 
I began by outlining non-philosophy's key concepts of philosophical decision, radi-
cal immanence, and cloning or modelisation. I then turned to Laruelle's first work to trace 
how he initially derived each of these concepts through his reading of Ravaisson's ontology. 
The critique of both Platonism and anti-Platonism as scissions of the Real, the need to syn-
thesise them through a single concept of being as radical immanence, and the means of 
materialising the One-in-person through different regional practices, the germ of all of this 
can already be found in Laruelle's reading of Ravaisson.  
What is most strikingly different in this early Laruelle compared to the later Laruelle 
is not that he lacks a concept of radical immanence that he clearly already possesses, but 
rather that he characterizes radical immanence as the object of study of philosophy or on-
tology. For the early Laruelle, the philosophies that divide the unity of the Real between 
two opposed terms do not mark the failure of philosophy as such, but merely that of all 
hitherto historical philosophies to achieve what remains philosophy's own mission to 
achieve a unified concept of all things, which radical immanence can alone provide. In his 
first book, then, Laruelle still holds that being and ontology have two significations: on the 
one hand, they denote a radical immanence at the root of all things whose study is the ob-
ject of philosophy; on the other hand, they name only a part of immanence that all historical 
philosophies have separated off from the whole and falsely opposed to the rest of it qua 
mere phenomena: "being itself can thus be interpreted in two opposed manners, of which 
the opposition explains the duality of methods: either as being of a synthetic nature or as 
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reduced to given phenomena" (Laruelle 1971, 237). At this early stage, Laruelle is content 
to say that we can conceive of being as an opposition or as radical immanence where the 
later Laruelle will only associate being (and ontology) with the former.  
By Philosophy II, Laruelle resolutely rejects that radical immanence is an answer to 
the question of being. Instead, being solely denotes Plato's Greco-unitary one rather than 
the unary One, which becomes the object of study for a non-philosophy or "science": "the 
One is not convertible with Being and must be described by itself outside of all functional 
requisition" (Laruelle 1991, 19). At the same time, Laruelle's notion in the dissertation that 
radical immanence is an answer to philosophy's project to uncover a unity of all things 
continues to betray itself whenever he repeatedly insists that non-philosophy, or what he 
has recently and tellingly referred to as "non-standard philosophy" is not the negation of 
philosophy, but its expansion (beyond decisional oppositions): "non-philosophy is not the 
absence or negation of philosophy, it is on the contrary its generalisation or its opening as 
correlate of the One rather than of Being" (Laruelle 1991, 20). What changes between Phi-
losophy II and the dissertation on Ravaisson is thus not the fundamental concepts, but the 
semantics: Laruelle conflates being with the Greco-One as distinct from his unary One, as 
well as ontology and philosophy with their historical decisions about being as distinct from 
non-philosophy and science as a cloning and modelisation of the Real.9 Ravaisson's critique 
of Platonic and anti-Platonic philosophies thus becomes Laruelle's critique of philosophy 
tout court as decisional. Ravaisson's post-Platonic ontology of the unity of being is translat-
ed as Laruelle's non-philosophical concept of radical immanence or the One-in-person. And 
Ravaisson's eclectic method reappears in the guise of Laruelle's notions of cloning and 
modelisation.  
By looking at Laruelle's reading of Ravaisson, we can see that Laruelle's own project 
has the same goal as that of first philosophy: the study of being qua being or the Real un-
derstood as the radical immanence of all things. Given that at the very least Ravaisson 
would have to be excluded from Laruelle's critique of philosophy in Laruelle's own account 
of his ontology as expressing a radical immanence, it would seem that Ray Brassier is right 
to argue that Laruelle conflates a certain kind of philosophizing (by decisions) with philos-
ophy as such: "Laruelle conflated the critique of a certain kind of philosophy with the cri-
tique of philosophy tout court" (Brassier 2007, 121). Along these lines, we can very well 
imagine philosophers objecting that Laruelle is wrong to distinguish philosophy from his 
                                                          
9 Even here, a historical philosophical precedent connected to Ravaisson can be found when Schelling 
makes a distinction between other philosophies and his own, which is more of a “science,” and even a 
“non-philosophy” in that it alone captures the absolute unifying all things (see Schelling 1980, 40; 
and 2010, 8). 
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own project, since he is committed to philosophy's basic mission of seizing the unity of all 
things, even as he departs from the historical solutions offered by philosophers hitherto as 
remaining too decisional.  
Ultimately, whether Laruelle is justified in distinguishing his non-philosophy from 
philosophy tout court, on the grounds that it differs in its solution if not its aim, is a matter 
of semantics. What is really of interest is how not only ecologists, feminists, and media, 
political and art theorists, but also philosophers and metaphysicians can take up Laruelle's 
(and indeed Ravaisson's all too overlooked) critique of our own tradition, so as to imma-
nently reform philosophy rather than oppose it from the outside. 
 
Vincent Le, Faculty of Arts and Education, Deakin University,  
v.le[at]deakin.edu.au 
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